May 18th, 2011

Joseph Rakofsky — I Have An Answer For You

Joseph Rakofsky, as seen on a copy of his website, recently taken down.

I’ve been sued. I’m 51 years old and this is a first for me, both personally and professionally.

And it flows from a post I wrote last month about the depths to which some attorneys will sink in their marketing, that also happened to mention that Joseph Rakofsky was incompetent as a lawyer. Also, that he had an ethical issue regarding an email he sent to an investigator asking him to “trick” a witness. He sued me for defamation.

First the background on how the suit came to be, in case you haven’t already read one of the gazillion other stories about it; I’d only dealt with it briefly before. I’ll also discuss how I’ve dealt with four past legal threats I’ve received. And finally, I’ll tell give you my response to being sued.

Pull up a chair. The story is good. Unless, of course, you are Rakofsky. Or his lawyer, Richard Borzouye.

Background of the murder trial and lawsuit

The basis of  my initial comments was an article in the Washington Post regarding a criminal trial Rakofsky defended. And the Post had, in turn, quoted the presiding judge among its sources.  The Post told the tale of the 33-year-old Rakofsky, a 2009 law school graduate admitted to practice in New Jersey, taking on his first-ever trial. A murder defense. In Washington D.C. Where he’s not even admitted to practice. (see: D.C. Superior Court judge declares mistrial over attorney’s competence in murder case)

So Rakofsky hired local counsel to help him, and get him admitted to practice in D.C. for the purpose of this one case. Nothing wrong with that part if, of course, he could properly handle such a case. Which the presiding judge said he couldn’t, with the Post reporting that the judge was “astonished” at Rakofsky’s performance and his “not having a good grasp of legal procedures.” Also, that his performance in the trial was “below what any reasonable person would expect in a murder trial.” And that “there was not a good grasp of legal procedures of what was, and was not, allowed to be admitted in trial, to the detriment of [the defendant].”

And the Post also reported that Rakofsky’s own co-counsel, that he hired to help him, said, “He was the attorney of record. I would offer what I thought was the best advice, and he wouldn’t accept it.”

And then there was the part about trying to “trick” a witness. According to the Post:

The filing included an e-mail that the investigator said was from Rakofsky, saying: “Thank you for your help. Please trick the old lady to say that she did not see the shooting or provide information to the lawyers about the shooting.” The e-mail came from Rakofsky’s e-mail account, which is registered to Rakofsky Law Firm in Freehold, N.J.

A mistrial followed, the story was published, and the legal blogosphere lit up with commentary, much of which dealt with his website and marketing where he pretended to have vast experience, when in reality he had little.  Much of that experience that he boasted about, it seems, came from being an intern, not a lawyer. Bloggers wrote about his incompetence and ethics problem, much of it in gory detail with full orchestration and 5-part harmony.

As a lawyer, he was still in his puppyhood, though you wouldn’t know if from the experience he described on his website.**  On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.

Still with me here? Because this is where it gets really bizarre.

Did Rakofsky go to lick his wounds and repair the damage he had done to his own reputation? No, he did not. Did he send emails or make calls to those bloggers he believed got the story wrong in order to give his version of the events? No, he did not.

Instead, he sued. Everybody.  This included the Washington Post, The American Bar Association, and Thomson Reuters. Scott Greenfield (one of my co-defendants) instantly dubbed the suit Rakofsky v. Internet. The Complaint is here. Mark Bennett (another co-defendant) has a compendium of posts on the subject, so I won’t give much more background.

Then, after getting ripped to shreds based on the frivolousness of the suit –after all, the bloggers he had sued were relying on a Post story quoting a judge —  he amended his Complaint to sue even more. When you only own a shovel, I suppose, you only know how to dig.

With the story in the news, one of the jurors appeared to reinforce what everyone was saying. Except worse. He wrote:

It was obvious from the opening statements that Mr Rakofsky was way out of his league and poorly trained for a proper court defense. Whatever momentary empathy any of us on the jury may have felt for Mr Rakofsky’s absolute ineptitude, were quickly absolved by our knowledge that a young man’s entire life was at stake. The absolute amateurish antics displayed by Mr Rakofsky were repulsive and oddly narcissistic. He had very little command of the law, and now hearing that Mr Deaner’s family actually hired him is truly upsetting. Most of us assumed that this was a court ordered public defender that may just have been too young and overwhelmed by a huge docket of cases to put together a proper defence. (More ugly comments from the juror about Rakofsky here.)

And so, buried deep on page 53 (paragraph 165 of the original Complaint and paragraph 172 of the Amended version if you are hunting this down), Rakofsky makes a claim against me, for writing thusly:

Ethics also comes into play with deception, as evidenced by one Joseph Rakofsky, a New York lawyer with scant experience, but whose website sung his praises in oh so many ways. Then he got a real client. Defending a murder case. Which of course, he was utterly incompetent to do…

(Where I will be in all the future amended Complaints is, of course, a mystery, as people continue to write and ridicule,  and he will presumably spend all of his waking hours amending and re-amending until he gets carpal tunnel syndrome.)

Rakofsky claims in the part of the suit pertaining to me, that “”Rakofsky was never declared ‘incompetent’,” as I had written. But he is wrong. He was declared incompetent. By me. And, of course, by many, many others. (Post headline read: D.C. Superior Court judge declares mistrial over attorney’s competence in murder case.)

Having given the basic outline of the story, I now turn to the part where I give my opinions. So let me go on to say that: In addition to being incompetent, I also think, based on the comments of the presiding judge, his co-counsel and the juror that spoke up, that he is unskillful, incapable, inept, unqualified, untrained, unprofessional, and clumsy. This is in addition to being a bumbler, blockhead, dolt, dingbat and chucklehead for having brought this suit, guaranteed to rain much unhappiness unto his name. I’ve got a thesaurus and I’m not afraid to use it.

But a Complaint in a lawsuit demands an Answer. That is a document that we lawyers file in the big white building with the fancy columns downtown. As it happens, that’s my home turf. I tried my first case there back around 1986, and I last appeared there this morning.

But hey, I got a blog too, so why not give a little explanation for why I will Answer the way I will?

How I’ve handled past legal threats:

I’ve been threatened with legal actions at least four times that I can remember. The first came from Avis, where one of their associate general counsel’s told me to cease and desist using the Avis logo to decorate my blog for a post regarding immunity for rental car companies. I had great fun with that, engaged the intellectual property bloggers to crowdsource legal opinions, and then told Avis to go stuff it.

The second one also came from a General Counsel, also from a large  company displeased at my using one of their  images to decorate a post about the company. She called me. I suggested she send a  letter to me setting forth her position why it wasn’t “fair use.” She never sent the letter. Smart move.

A third one came from someone unhappy that I linked to her. Go figure.  My spam folder is filled with solicitations asking for links. While the post was a simple nuts-and-bolts practice tip about intake questionnaires — and possibly the most boring post I ever put up on my site, so please forgive me for even linking to it —  I nevertheless told her also that I wouldn’t take it down. Then she changed the text of the post I had linked to, making the link irrelevant, and I had to kill the link. But the post stayed up in all its awfulness.

A fourth dealt with the issue of insurance fraud, and a company that provides so-called “independent” doctors for defense medical exams, except that a doctor on the witness stand was caught with written instructions directing him to omit opinions from the “independent” report if they were favorable to the plaintiff. I heard about it through the grapevine and put on my journalist hat to see if I could find out who did this slimy thing. I tracked the company website to a doctor’s home address and published it. Then I got a call from a screaming lawyer (the doctor’s son) because I had put his father’s home address on the web, and moreover he told me, his father had nothing to do with the company. I hung up on him as he was threatening to haul me in front of a judge. Then he called back, having cooled his heels a bit, and ‘fessed up  that he was actually the owner of the company with the slimy instruction letter. So, because I now had additional (and much better) information, that being his admission to being the company owner, I edited the post to bring it up to date (and explained why).

My Answer to Rakofsky:

Now we are here. An actual lawsuit against me. You probably have the idea by now that I don’t suffer fools too gladly. And that posture doesn’t change today.

One of the demands Rakofsky made is that the defendants not mention his name. Or use his picture. Which is truly bizarre. He seems desperate to scrub the Internet of his follies.

I am tempted to write, in response to the suit, “Go shit in a hat and pull it down over your ears.” But that doesn’t sound very lawyerly. So I’ll say it in Latin. Vado shit in a hat quod traho is down super vestri ears.*

OK, maybe I used a translating website for that. You don’t really think I write Latin, do you? I suppose, for future reference, we can just call it the GSIAH defense. Or VSIAH if you like the pseudo-Latin that came out of the translator and you want to wow your friends with your knowledge of the Internet’s hottest new acronym.

Yeah, I digressed. But that was worth it, no?

What was Rakofsky thinking? That a bunch of lawyers that make their living in the well of the courtroom, accustomed to walking a high-wire without a net as we cross-examine hostile witnesses, would somehow cower in fear at an utterly frivolous lawsuit? Did he think that those of us that write blogs, for all to see, might not somehow have a basic grasp of the First Amendment? Didn’t he know, well before he even went to law school, that people have a right to set forth their opinions? How could he survive law school and pass a bar exam without knowing constitutional fundamentals? Perhaps the better question, why wasn’t he thinking of what would happen in response to such a suit? Was he a spoiled child that got everything he wanted simply by throwing a tantrum?

And those of us that are practicing lawyers are the small fries, compared with our co-defendants Washington Post, American Bar Association and Thompson Reuters. Like they are going to roll over and  pull down their articles? Good grief.

Rakofsky’s choices at this point seem limited. But certainly, the first thing he ought to do is put away the damn shovel as he is burying himself with it.

Yeah, there’s more to come.

*Update: I’ve been told by Luigi de Guzman that the proper translation, or as proper as possible, is vade et caca in pilleum et ipse traheatur super aures tuos (go shit in a [knit] hat & let that same hat itself be pulled over your ears).

Update #2: This post has generated some unusually heavy traffic, so here is my official Welcome to all you new readers getting ready to head out the door…

**Addendum (5/26/11) – While Rakofsky apparently took down most of his websites/marketing as of this writing, at least one of them has been preserved  at this link as an example of misleading attorney marketing for a lawyer just starting out. I have used a photo from that source.  The picture serves as a contrast to the older, gray haired gentlemen — who apparently have no relation to Rakofsky’s  firm —  that also were used on the Rakofsky site.

Update #3 (5/31/11): The Rakofsky Defamation Case (And Why I Won’t Be Posting Much)

 

December 15th, 2010

Bill of Rights Day

Since today is Bill of Rights Day, I thought I would re-direct you to a post of mine from 2008 on the subject: The Bill of Rights and John Peter Zenger.

You can test your civics knowledge by seeing how many of the 10 rights you can name, without looking it up.

Bonus question: How many different rights are incorporated in the First Amendment? (Listed here)

Second Bonus question: Which President established today as Bill of Rights Day? And before looking, is the person Democrat or Republican? (Answer is here.) And do you think that political orientation means anything when it comes to the Bill of Rights?

Some other posts on the subject, from this year and years’ past:

Bill of Rights Day (Cato Institute, 12/15/10)

EDITORIAL: Celebrate the Bill of Rights (Washington Times, 12/15/10)

National Constitution Center with 15 minute webcast

It’s Bill of Rights Day (f/k/a, 12/15/08)

Blawg Review 190 – Bill of Rights Day (Legal Satyricon, 12/15/08)

Photo credit: Me

 

December 14th, 2010

Supreme Court Kills New York’s “New” Attorney Advertising Rules

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court put the final nail in the coffin of New York’s “new” attorney disciplinary rules regarding advertising when it refused to review a Second Circuit decision that struck most of the rules. I put “new” in quotes because they actually date to February 1, 2007, just months after I opened this little blog.

And I’ve been following the issue ever since. See January, 5, 2007;  New Attorney Advertising Rules (Is This Blog an Advertisement?)

Most of the rules were first  struck down by the U.S. District Court in July 2007 when challenged by Public Citizen on behalf of the upstate firm of Alexander & Catalano. And the Second Circuit upheld those determinations in April of this year. (Sonia Sotomayor was on the panel that heard the case, but had gone to the Supreme Court by the time the decision came down.)

Those broad-based rules tried to stop a variety of advertising techniques, but did so in a fashion that ran headlong into the First Amendment. The rules had barred, among other things, testimonials from clients relating to pending matters, portrayals of judges or fictitious law firms, attention-getting techniques unrelated to attorney competence, and trade names or nicknames that imply an ability to get results.

As I pointed out in one of my first posts, simply putting a picture of yourself on a lawfirm website could be construed as violating the prohibition against “characteristics clearly unrelated to legal competence.” The picture will tell the potential client your age, your race and your sex, but what will it tell them about legal competence? Nada. Ergo, under the new rules the photo could be a violation.

Obviously, this wasn’t why the rules were crafted. They came in response to the embarrassing aftermath of the October 2003 Staten Island Ferry disaster that killed 11, and the onslaught of ads in the Staten Island Advance the next day. Those ads were placed while rescue efforts were still ongoing at the ferry that day. It was not one of the better moments of the personal injury bar. And that incident brought about New York’s 30 day anti-solicitation rule, part of the new set of rules but one which was not affected by this ruling.

But the new rules went after problems that didn’t just have to do with 30 day time limits.

Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, who wrote the District Court opinion striking down almost all the other rules, summed up the problem this way in a buried footnote on page 29 of his decision:

Without question there has been a proliferation of tasteless, and at times obnoxious, methods of attorney advertising in recent years. New technology and an increase in the types of media available for advertising have exacerbated this problem and made it more ubiquitous. As a result, among other things, the public perception of he legal profession has been greatly diminished.

But in re-crafting rules in an attempt to solve this problem, the crafters went way too far. So far, in fact, that the only way to defend them was to assert that attorneys couldn’t use humor.

For it was humor that formed part of the basis of the state’s response to the Alexander & Catalano lawsuit. AS described the by state in one of its filings, the firm advertised that it:

retained by aliens, have the ability to leap tall buildings in a single bound, or have stomped around downtown Syracuse, Godzilla-style.

And the argument by the state against this? That it wasn’t truthful. SeeNew York Responds to Lawsuit Challenging New Attorney Advertising Rules — By Banning Humor

When I read the state’s brief, that I discussed at some length in that post, I knew the rules were toast.

While the ads may have been tasteless and embarrassing to the profession, no person with a functioning brain could have believed that the firm had actually been retained by aliens or done any of the other eye-catching things in those commercials.

And so the First Amendment ruled the day, as the rules over reached to ban more than just dishonesty.

Now I sure as hell wouldn’t want to pick a jury in any courtroom if my firm was busy running such moronic ads, but taste is not something that can be regulated.

———————-

See also on the Supreme Court’s action:

SCOTUS Gives Nod to 2nd Circuit OK of ‘Heavy Hitters’ Law Firm Slogan & Descriptive Trade Names (ABA Journal)

US Supreme Court to New York Lawyers: You Are Awesome (Tannebaum @ My Law License)

Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Lawyer Advertising Case (Robson @ Constitutional Law Prof Blog)

Good News for ‘Heavy Hitters’: High Court Sidesteps Lawyer Advertising Dispute (Koppel @ WSJ Law Blog)

 

June 3rd, 2010

Elena Kagan In Private Practice (And Her First Amendment Experience)

I know, you’ve been sitting there on the edge of your seat waiting for this, ever since I discussed the serious lack of private practice work by Elena Kagan. Which wouldn’t be so bad except that only Justice Kennedy seems to have had any private practice experience. Basically, 98% of the legal time for Supreme Court justices has been in academia or public service.

So  Kagan’s Senate Judiciary questionairre was released, and with drool running from my mouth I searched for all that I could on her private practice — much as I did with Sonia Sotomayor when I found her little private firm, Sotomayor & Associates that had no actual associates and subsequently became  a minor issue.

And it turns out, while at the BigLaw firm of Williams & Connolly between 1989 and 1991, Kagan actually did some First Amendment work that was interesting. In fact, of the 10 “most significant litigated matters which you personally handled” that the the Senate Judiciary Committee asked her to list, five had to do with the First Amendment. And, despite being a very junior associate, she was actually given the chance to argue a couple of times in court.

[Note, Eugene Volokh has written about her First Amendment scholarship that followed the years of private practice. This post is only about the real-world experience that preceded it. A full round-up of her career, including scholarship but missing the real-world stuff, is at SCOTUSblog]

OK, here is the set-up —  you’re sitting down, right? — on page 71…

I have had private clients only during the time I was an associate at Williams & Connolly. Those clients included business entities in civil litigation, press organizations defending themselves in libel and related actions, and white- collar criminal defendants.

She goes on to write that her private work was “primarily” in federal court and that it was divided 2/3 to civil and 1/3 to criminal. She concedes having never tried a case to verdict. That wouldn’t be so bad, of course, if the high court had others that had done so for private individuals.

Now to the meat and potatoes: On pages 188-195 she is asked to “Describe the ten (10) most significant litigated matters which you personally handled, whether or not you were the attorney of record.”  As you can see below, some of this stuff is anything but interesting, which gives a bit of insight perhaps in to what happens to junior associates at BigLaw firms.

So here is Elena Kagan’s Top 10 List of private cases. The First Amendment ones can be seen below as d-h. (I’ve listed all 10, in case people find any of the other stuff interesting — two are criminal matters):

(a) Federal Realty Investment Trust v. Pacific Insurance Co., No. R-88-3658. We represented a real estate investment trust in an action against an insurer for the costs of defense associated with a prior litigation. I began work on the case in the middle of the litigation; I did some late discovery and drafted most of the pre-trial motions. On the eve of trial, Judge Norman Ramsey of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland ruled in favor of our position on the appropriate standard for allocating defense costs between covered and uncovered parties and claims (760 F. Supp. 533 (1991)). This ruling immediately produced a settlement favorable to our client.

(b) In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., Nos. 81 B 10311, 81 B 10916, 81 B 11059, 81 B 12345, 81 B 12525, 81 B 11845, 81 B 11004, 81 B 11512. We represented Seatrain Lines, Inc., a debtor in bankruptcy, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York (Judge Burton Lifland presiding) in connection with an application by Chase Manhattan Bank and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy for legal fees associated with the bankruptcy case. In response to the filing of the fee application, our client counterclaimed against Chase for the recovery of the costs of preserving and disposing of certain properties subject to Chase’s security interest. I handled some of the discovery and drafted most of the pleadings. When the court denied Chase’s motion to strike our counterclaim (and a subsequent motion for reconsideration), the parties settled on terms favorable to our client.

(c) Toyota of Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, Nos. 4-89-594-15, 4-89-595-15. We represented Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc. in a suit brought by one of its franchisees alleging fraud, intentional interference with contract, violations of RICO, and a host of other claims. I drafted numerous pleadings in the case, including an opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to remand (granted by Judge Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for South Carolina at 713 F. Supp. 898 (1989)), as well as motions to dismiss and discovery motions (ruled on by Judge Edwin Cottingham of the Court of Common Pleas for Darlington County). I also handled some of the discovery. I left the firm prior to trial. Ultimately, a verdict for the plaintiff was dismissed on appeal.

(d) Byrd v. Randi, No. MJG-89-636. We represented defendant Montcalm Publishing Corp. in a libel action arising from an allegation that the plaintiff was in prison for child molestation. The case presented issues relating to the “libel-proof plaintiff” doctrine, the definition of a “limited purpose public figure,” and the actual malice standard. I did most of the discovery, drafted our summary judgment motion and other pleadings, and argued the summary judgment motion before the district court. After initially denying the motion, Judge Marvin Garbis of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the case a few months later on a motion for reconsideration.

(e) In Re Application of News World Communications, Inc., Nos. 89-3160, 89-212. We represented the Washington Post and WRC-TV in this effort to compel release to the public of unredacted transcripts of audiotapes to be received in evidence at a criminal trial. I argued motions before Judge Charles Richey of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel release of the transcripts and to prevent redaction. Judge Richey granted both motions, with the latter reported at 17 Media L. Rep. 1001 (1989). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, with Judges Wald, Silberman, and Sentelle hearing argument, denied a motion to stay this order (17 Media L. Rep. 1004 (1989)).

(f) J. Odell Anders v. Newsweek, Inc., No. 90-715. We represented Newsweek, Inc. on appeal from a jury verdict in its favor in a libel action filed in the Southern District of Mississippi. The case raised questions about the actual malice standard, as well as numerous evidentiary issues. I drafted the appellate brief urging affirmance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in our favor by unpublished opinion (judgment reported at 949 F.2d 1159 (1991)).

(g) Luke Records, Inc. v. Nick Navarro, No. 90-5508. We filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of America and numerous record companies, challenging the decision of the district court that a musical recording was obscene under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California. I drafted the brief in the case, which stressed the difficulty of holding music obscene under prevailing constitutional law. Judge Lively, joined by Judges Anderson and Roney, reversed the district court’s decision (960 F.2d 134 (1992)).

(h) Bagbey v. National Enquirer, No. CV 89-2177. We represented the National Enquirer in this libel action brought by a person mistakenly identified in the publication as being Jimmy Swaggert’s father. I drafted all pleadings and did all discovery in the case, which began in Louisiana state court but which we removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (Judge F.A. Little, Jr.). We eventually settled the case on terms favorable to our client.

(i) Chuang v. United States, No. 89-1309. We represented Joseph Chuang, a former bank president, on his appeal from a criminal conviction for numerous counts of bank fraud. The principle issues in the case concerned the propriety of two warrantless searches of the bank, one by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and one by the FDIC. I drafted most sections of the brief, which argued among other matters (1) that the statute authorizing the OCC’s search failed to provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, as required by the Supreme Court, and (2) that the FDIC’s search was invalid because it went beyond the bank premises into Chuang’s law firm offices. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, with Judge Timbers writing and Judges Newman and Altimari joining (897 F.2d 646 (1990)).

(j) United States v. Jarrett Woods, We represented the former head of the Western Savings Association, a failed savings and loan, in both a grand jury investigation and a number of civil suits brought against him. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board had declared the S&L insolvent and placed it in receivership after discovering various suspect real estate loans. In addition to trying to keep the civil suits at bay, we tracked the grand jury investigation of Woods closely for more than a year – interviewing each of the many people brought before the grand jury – before Woods became unable to afford the representation. Woods was subsequently indicted and convicted of numerous counts of bank fraud.

So I was all prepared to say that we were about to put on the Supreme Court another person without any real private practice experience at all. But, in fact, she has a very small amount. Nothing earth shattering for sure, but a tiny amount nonetheless.

One quirk I noticed in (h), Bagbey v. National Enquirer: She says that “We eventually settled the case on terms favorable to our client.” I wonder if there was a non-disclosure agreement regarding that settlement, and if so, if her comments about settling on “favorable” terms violated it.

Update: I could see how some Senators might review some of her First Amendment briefs, which should be publicly available in court files, to inquire as to whether she actually believed in some of the positions that she took. That could put her on the spot to either defend, or distance, herself from a position that she advocated.

Update x2 — Elsewhere:

 

March 24th, 2010

Can Jury Consider All Damages, if Only Some Meet the No-Fault Threshold?


Today’s case solves a quirk in New York’s No-Fault law regarding the “serious injury” threshold that must be met in order to bring a lawsuit. That threshold was established in the ’70s in order to cut back on the number of personal injury cases that resulted from car accidents.

So here’s the question: If the threshold is met under one category of injury, can other categories of injuries be considered by the jury? For example, if the jury finds the threshold has been met with a fracture of the finger (#4 below) but that the back injuries didn’t qualify as a “Significant limitation of use of a body function or system” (# 8 below), can the back injuries be considered by the jury in assessing damages?

These are the categories that the legislature says define “serious injury” under New York’s miserable No-Fault law:

  1. A personal injury that results in death;
  2. Dismemberment;
  3. A significant disfigurement;
  4. A fracture;
  5. The loss of a fetus;
  6. Permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system;
  7. Permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member;
  8. Significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or
  9. A medically determined injury or impairment of a non- permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment”.

This issue arose in Rubin v. SMS Taxi, decided yesterday by the Appellate Division (First Department). Defendant had moved for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiff didn’t meet the No-Fault threshold. The lower court granted the motion for all injuries except for the significant disfigurement that the plaintiff suffered. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion for clarification or reconsideration,wherein he wanted to know if, having met threshold in one category, he could proceed to argue all the injuries.

And the First Department reversed with respect to the motion to clarify, and held unambiguously that

“once a jury determines plaintiff has met the threshold for serious injury, the jury may award damages for all of plaintiff’s injuries causally related to the accident, even those not meeting the serious injury threshold.”

In its decision, the court also cited to a Second Department case (Marte v. New York City Transit Auth.) as support.

Without question, it’s an important principle to remember for all practitioners: You only need to prove one of the categories falls within the serious injury threshold to then proceed for an assessment for all of the injuries that were causally related to the accident.