June 27th, 2015

Yo Scalia! Play Nice!

Justice Antonin Scalia

It seems that my Brooklyn-born guest blogger today, Jay Breakstone, was none too pleased with the temperament of Queens-raised Antonin Scalia yesterday while dissenting in the landmark case of Obergefell v. Hodges that legalized same sex marriage in all states.

And Breakstone, an appellate wordsmith, has a few words to Justice Scalia, on minding his manners. From one city kid to another. And so, without further ado, a few comments on Nasty Nino…

———By Jay Breakstone———–

Comments about Justice Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, the gay marriage decision from the Supreme Court, have been grossly unfair. As one wag once said, even Hitler was a hell of a dancer. If we look hard enough, we can overlook the worst in anybody, even Justice Scalia.

Sure, Justice Scalia may have been unhappy with the rigors of real-live legal practice at Jones, Day before moving on to academia and “public service,” but that’s okay, isn’t it?  You don’t really expect Harvard magnas and editors of its law review to work for a living like the rest of us, do you?

Sure, he may be acerbic in his writing, but he’s really funny. Just before describing the majority opinion in Obergefell as the product of “hubris” amounting to a “judicial putsch,” Justice Scalia identified the actors in that putsch—his fellow justices— as follows:

“[T]his Court . . . Consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at Harvard of Yale Law School.  Four the nine are natives of New York City.  Eight of them grew up in east– and west-coast States. No one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of Americans), or even a Protestant of any denomination.”

See how funny that is?  Well, how about that this is being written by the first Italian-American justice?

What confuses me is that Italian-Americans only comprise only 5.6% of the American population. So under Justice Scalia’s theory, how are they entitled to two justices (Scalia and Alito) of their own?

How about if we join them with the Jews? After all, there are Italian Jews, such as Fiorello LaGuardia (descended from a great rabbi on his mother’s side.) That would give Justice Scalia another 1.4%, or 7% in total.

Still, in ScaliaMath, not a significant enough cultural/ethnic/religious group to warrant the appointment of two whole justices (fractional justices being ignored.)

Maybe Justice Scalia could he be the “short people’s justice?” After all, he is only 5’ 7” tall and is probably the shortest male on the Court. However, RBG is fully notorious at barely 5 feet tall.

If the anti-Scalia group is still less than comfortable with the absence of any Protestants on the present bench (Scalia is a Roman Catholic), then they can always be reminded that for its first 180 years, almost all the justices were Protestants – – and male at that.

No, Nino, we can’t choose our justices based on who they are, where they come from, or who they pray to. But we can surely choose them based on their courtesy to their colleagues and the ability to see beyond themselves.

We don’t think it’s particularly clever to refer to colleagues who don’t think the way you do as members of a “putsch,” knowing (and you know everything) that the term refers to the attempt by Hitler and his Nazi Party to seize control of Bavaria in 1923, especially when two of your colleagues are part of that over-represented group on the Court, the Jews.  At best, its self-centered and narrow beyond excuse.

In the final analysis, perhaps you’re just not a nice person.  Or maybe you’re this way only when you lose, twice (Obamacare on Thursday), in the same week. But even Evangelicals would only call that being a “sore-loser.”

Nasty, even in what one believes is a last-ditch defense of all that is good about American democracy, ill-becomes a Justice of the Supreme Court.

 

 

June 22nd, 2015

South Carolina: So Long and Farewell (Updated)

The Confederate flag flies at the South Carolina statehouse in the wake of mass murder by a racist. (photo by Sean Rayford for Getty Images, via the New York Times)

The Confederate flag flies at the South Carolina State House in the wake of mass murder by a racist. (photo by Sean Rayford for Getty Images, via the New York Times)

(I’m hijacking my law blog today to publish this letter I’m sending to Gov. Nikki Haley of South Carolina, and others as listed below.)

Dear Governor Haley:

I’ve come down to South Carolina the past 13 years with a group of old college friends for vacation. Hilton Head is nice.

But so long and farewell. We are taking our vacation dollars elsewhere.

The sight of the Confederate battle flag flying full staff at your State House in the wake of a racially based church massacre is just too much. That a symbol of slavery should still be flying at a state capitol, 150 years after the Civil War ended, is not just bizarre, but contemptible and vile.

A photo from a white supremacist website showing Dylann Storm Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting. (via New York Times)

A photo from a white supremacist website showing Dylann Storm Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting. (via New York Times)

I know that there are some who try to rationalize the use of the flag as some type of cultural antebellum throw-back to a simpler time. But that simpler time was abhorrent for those enslaved.

The empty rhetoric of cultural symbolism from flag supporters is highlighted by the fact that South Carolina had the highest percentage of it’s population in slavery, at a stunning 57%. I would think you might actually care about what their descendants see their government glorifying. There is no justification for waving the flag of slavery in their faces.

Your state will get our money no longer. There are plenty of other nice places we can go to the beach and play a little golf. We need not do it under the fluttering colors of racism.

I know that you think it’s perfectly OK to keep that flag flying, as long as CEOs don’t complain. I know this because you said so in a debate last year:

“What I can tell you is over the last three and a half years, I spent a lot of my days on the phones with CEOs and recruiting jobs to this state,” Haley said. “I can honestly say I have not had one conversation with a single CEO about the Confederate flag.”

So it isn’t about principle for you, it’s about money.

I saw that the victims’ families made a number of very forgiving comments about the killer:

“You took something very precious away from me,”  a family representative for Ethel Lance, the 70-year-old grandmother who died in Wednesday’s massacre, told Roof on behalf of Lance’s loved ones. “I will never talk to her ever again. I will never be able to hold her again. But I forgive you and have mercy on your soul. You hurt me. You hurt a lot of people, but I forgive you.”

I can not even imagine that I would be so charitable. You are very lucky to have such people in your state. It’s a shame you don’t appreciate them.

confederate-flagSince it’s about money for you and not principle, I will send a copy of this letter to the Marriott, where we stay. I want them to know that they have lost our business because of you.

I will likewise send copies to the owners of many of the restaurants that we have enjoyed over our 13 years, letting them know why we will not return. And I will make it available on the web, for the few people that might find it on my blog.

All is not lost for you, of course, as there are likely a number of skinhead, neo-Nazi and white power hate groups that revel in what you are doing. Perhaps they will bring their business to Hilton Head instead, and stay in your fine hotels, eat in your nice restaurants and tee off on your many golf courses.  I’m sure the owners will welcome them with open arms.

–Eric Turkewitz and friends

Update, 6/23/15 — My post went up around 7 am, and at 4 pm Gov. Haley asked the Legislature to take down the flag.  But it still flies, as ⅔ of each legislative house must approve its removal.

So the burden is clearly now at the feet of South Carolina’s legislative branch.  Will the state continue to fly the flag of slavery, segregation and subjugation or not?

I have no intention of bringing my tourist dollars back to South Carolina while it flies.

 

June 16th, 2015

The First Rule of Lawyering

Voldemort

Since Atilla the Hun lived before the age of photography, I went for the next best thing….

Over at Above the Law, Mark Herrmann was commenting yesterday on ways for associates to screw up. Hermann is a terrific writer, and author of the highly regarded Curmudgeons Guide to Practicing Law that I reviewed in 2008, as well as Inside Straight, a collection of his writings from Above the Law.

But he said one thing in yesterday’s piece that really jumped out at me, as he discussed an article from another site on that subject. And that had to do with a lawyer’s personal demeanor, which I’ve bolded for you since block quotes generally suck:

The folks in the Law360 article did okay. Their six ways for associates to disappoint were: Don’t (1) be visible enough, (2) take ownership of your work, (3) be thorough, (4) be pleasant, (5) know how to talk on the phone, and (6) sow the seeds of business development.

I’m deeming numbers 1 (visibility) and 6 (developing business) to be duplicative and 5 (talking on the phone) to be penny-ante. And, personally, I don’t much care about number 4 (being nice). Maybe I’m out of the mainstream here, but I’m the person who said: “Attila the Hun? Guy’s got a nasty mean streak, but at least he can do his job. Hire him.” I’ll accept an awful lot of personality quirks in exchange for the chance to work with someone who’s smarter than I am and writes and speaks better than I do.

Ugh. This violates my First Rule of Lawyering: Don’t be Attila the Hun.

But why?, I hear some of you cry!  We’re supposed to be tough as nails in litigation and doing everything possible (within the law) to win!

And here’s the issue: During the course of the litigation there will be a time when one side needs an extra day or week for something. And you don’t know if that someone will be your client or someone else.

If your client is scheduled for a court-ordered deposition on October 10, for example, and it happens to be the week she is taking a short vacation, or the day of her daughter’s 2nd grade play, you want to be able to pick up the phone and request common courtesies for a new day. So long as there is no genuine strategic issue, that serves the client well.

But if you have been acting like Attila the Hun and thought it was good lawyering to deny even small courtesies to the other side? Well, guess what?

The other lawyer might tell you to go jump in the lake when the shoe is on the other foot. What goes around comes around. Karma. And all that.

That courtesy might not be granted. To the detriment of your client. Because you thought you could act like Attila the Hun on something in a Take-No-Prisonors litigation strategy.

Keeping a good, working professional relationship with the adversary’s counsel, while still doing what you are retained to do, is often a tough thing. Tempers may flair if you aren’t careful in even the most routine deposition.

This doesn’t mean that the lawyer stops short of arguing his heart out just to be nice, only that there is an art to disagreeing without being disagreeable.

All of this comes home to roost, often, if one side or the other wishes to talk settlement. Sitting down for a cup of coffee with Attila to discuss why a settlement should be more/less beneficial to the client, may be difficult if someone was acting like a jerk. Sitting down with  a human is much easier.

And that is what serves the client.

A story I’ve told before and I’ll tell again: When I was in law school I watched my father try a medical malpractice case in Brooklyn. He and the other lawyer would go head-to-head in the courtroom, acting within every meaning of the phrase “zealous advocacy.” Then they would grab a cup of coffee together after court.

Best lesson in the law I ever had.

 

June 9th, 2015

NY Top Court: It’s Still OK To Be Negligent With Your Dog

Not the dog in the lawsuit, but mine. Does Tucker look like he would hurt anyone? Or obey a command to come?

Not the dog in the lawsuit, but mine. Does Tucker look like he would hurt anyone? Or even obey a command to come?

It wasn’t the dog’s fault. His owner called for him in Central Park, and he bolted across the road exactly as commanded. And into the path of a bicyclist. The animal was not dangerous, but rather, was directed to do something that was.

New York has had a long standing rule that held that, for pets, one could only bring a lawsuit under strict liability, if the pet had a known vicious propensity (see: Bard v. Jahnke). Hence the phrase, every dog gets one bite. We didn’t have a common law cause of action based on negligence.

It was all about whether or not that bite Fido took could have been reasonably anticipated. And if Fido had that propensity (either by bite or other aggressive behavior), the owner was responsible no matter what.

Would this case change things? Our high court had already ruled in Hastings v. Suave that the owner of a cow that innocently strays past a dilapidated fence into the road could be held liable. Why not a dog? This isn’t about the animal, but about the owner.

I discussed back in 2013 how this case — alleging only negligence and not strict liability — was headed to the Court of Appeals when a divided panel of our Appellate Division (First Department) ruled that the case could go forward. It was time, I guessed, for our archaic and unfair law to be updated.

At that time I ventured a prediction:

My prediction: New York’s long-held policy of granting immunity to animal owners for their own negligence (as opposed to the animal’s viciousness) will fall by the wayside as illogical.  Immunity for negligence makes no sense at all, and is something that only a legislature can grant.

I was wrong. New York’s Court of Appeals today re-affirmed in Doerr v. Goldsmith that owners were still free to be negligent with their pets; owners get immunity from negligence.

The opinion is quite short. But there is a lengthy concurrence and two separate dissents.

Judge Abdus-Salaam thought it necessary, in concurring, to discuss at length the two cases before the court (the other, Dubinsky v. Lockhart, also dealt with loose dogs hitting a bicyclist, and alleged both negligence and strict liability). She started with our jurisprudence going back 200 years, when bites were the only issue in a rural society where the fastest mode of travel was a horse.

But despite her lengthy analysis — which includes the history of our pets being able to roam free on the streets and the expectations of others that this would occur — her opinion did not speak for the majority. She argues, unconvincingly in my opinion, that:

“[t]he average New Yorker knows or ought to know that he or she will encounter insufficiently restrained pets, which are not confined to the owner’s premises and may harm others depending on the disposition of the pet and the degree of training it has received”

Frankly, if I were walking on the streets of the city, I would not expect an unrestrained pet. We have leash laws, you know.  It’s like saying you should expect drunk drivers on the road, and therefore there is no liability for the drunk running the light because you should expect drunk drivers.

And so we get argument for a one-size-fits-all rule regardless of whether you are in the nation’s biggest city or one of our many rural hamlets.

In arguing for the retention of the easy-to-follow rule of granting immunity that comes from our prior agrarian society, she writes:

In general, we do not cast aside precedent unless it has become unworkable, increasingly irrational and/or increasingly unjust over time.

Well, “unjust” would certainly seem to fit these circumstances, but I’m not on the bench.

Chief Judge Lippman, in dissent, notes this about the existing rule that he fought to change:

…application of the rule in this instance would serve only to immunize defendant from the consequences of her own negligent actions, for no reason other than that a dog happened to be involved in the accident.

Yep, that is it, immunity for tortfeasors. A concept that is generally foreign to our common law jurisprudence.

And this, regarding the defendant-owner deliberately setting in motion the chain of events:

…people expend significant amounts of time and effort, and sometimes go to great expense, in an effort to train their dogs to be obedient.  When those efforts are successful and the dog acts according to the owner’s command, that is not a vicious propensity, but should not necessarily result in the owner’s immunity from liability.

Judge Fahey also dissented, and noted that our common law jurisprudence is pretty good, that there is a long line of cases going back over 100 years to support a negligence cause of action against dogs, and that there doesn’t need to be this exception:

We should return to the basic principle that the owner of an animal may be liable for failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation. I cannot join the Court’s memorandum opinion and I disagree with the analysis put forward in the concurring opinion

So this is the rule in New York: If a farm animal wanders off because of the negligence of the owner, the owner can be held negligent. But if the animal is a pet, the answer is the opposite.

Welcome to New York.

 

May 21st, 2015

Jury Selection, Brooklyn Style

Brooklyn’s county courthouse, 2008. Photo credit: me.

Two recent articles in Reason by its Editor in Chief, Matt Welch, raised issues about New York’s jury selection process and are very much worth discussing. Welch, as you’ll see, didn’t find the experience as amusing as my screenwriter-brother, or get any of the hoped-for excitement that my niece Ellen wanted, and certainly didn’t appreciate it the way I did when I sat jury duty many moons ago (and was selected).

So on to the main event: Welch. When I first read the first of his two articles in his libertarian oriented magazine, I was ready to mock, parody and lampoon his never-ending stream of whines, complaints, grumbles and gripes. That was my gut reaction, and it was going to be fun.

But there was one big point he made and one big point that he botched, and both are deserving of attention.

First, his take on the selection process: He bitched, whined, moaned and complained about the Brooklyn courthouse architecture, the dirty plaza in front, the security, and the ever-so-slow orientation and waiting to be placed in a voir dire pool to be questioned by lawyers. (How Jury Duty Almost Turned Me into an Anarchist)

When he finally gets there, he sounds like Arlo Guthrie showing up to his draft board after a long night of drinking — prepared to be injected, inspected, detected, infected, neglected and selected. In meeting the lawyers for the case, what type of mind set do you think he started with?

Is this stuff important, or just superficial belly-aching by someone looking for material to write about, as he did in his book about similar issues?

Answer: It’s important!! You don’t shoot the messenger because you don’t like the message.  He made a valid point that some jurors may be poisoned by the process itself, even before actual selection started. Anyone who practices law in Brooklyn knows we need vastly more room and judges.

And court administrators should take note, to the extent that they have the capacity to actually do anything about it within the tight financial constraints that the Legislature imposes.

Subway art, Borough Hall station where the courthouses are. Photo credit: Me.

Wouldn’t everyone — jurors, lawyers, judges, clerks and officers — rather be inside that great, big, new, shiny federal courthouse down the block? You betcha. It’s vastly more civilized, and jurors don’t start the trial phase, if they get there, feeling abused. The building itself, and the federal administration of it, oozes competence and justice (much to the chagrin, likely, of criminal defendants).

And feeling abused is important, for then the aggravations and irritations of the process itself may simply confirm pre-existing biases to the detriment of one side or the other.

Confirmation bias is a huge issue to deal with in jury selection (and the issue Welch botched). Because many people instinctively look for facts to “prove” the thoughts they had before hearing evidence, or reading a news story. They want to know that their opinions were “right.” This is most commonly seen in politics, where everything  on “the other side” is wrong.

Welch states that he wants to do the right thing, claiming near the outset of his piece:

Jury duty is a chance to bond with fellow citizens you might not otherwise meet, peek under the hood of our flawed judicial system, and do our small part to advance the noble democratic ideal of participatory justice.

And he also writes, in his own defense that:

…I would also say that within libertarianism there’s a broad appreciation that the civil system provides the kind of redress unavailable in places like Western Europe, for example. And at any rate, I don’t have strongly held opinions about it; my strongly held opinions are about the criminal justice system.

But when I look under the hood of his writings, in just these two pieces, I see a pre-existing proclivity, and the concern any lawyer would have for potential confirmation bias if he were to sit in judgment. Describing the case as he first hears about it in the jury selection room, he writes:

It is, to my chagrin, a civil trial, not a criminal one, involving the category of incident one might see advertised in a subway car.

Ouch. OK, he is entitled to his opinion for sure, regardless of whether I like it or not. But it’s hard to miss the underlying bias.

In his second piece, entitled How Lawyers Pre-Try Cases During Jury Selection, he tries to claim the voir dire process (and the jurors) are abused by the lawyers trying their cases in the room without a judge or evidence.

And he continues his complaints by dropping another clue as to his underlying feelings, calling plaintiff’s counsel a “Court Street Lawyer” with a link to a derisive description.

Moses with the law, at the entrance to the Brooklyn courthouse. 2008. Photo credit, me.

Now the vast majority of people will say, and likely believe, that they can sit fairly and listen to evidence, if the question is put to them directly. But this is a very superficial question, and ignores the underlying biases a juror may have. And that, in turns ignores the very legitimate concerns that such jurors will engage in confirmation bias as they listen to the evidence. This is what the trial lawyer needs to worry about, regardless of who they represent.

Welch himself knows about confirmation bias. On just the 4th page of his book The Declaration of Independents, he writes with co-author Nick Gillespie:

You may have heard of confirmation bias, whereby people tend to notice and believe whatever rumors, news stories and quasi-academic studies confirm their world view.

But seeing it in others is altogether different than seeing it in the mirror.

It was during that second piece, that he argued that the lawyers were looking to get rid of all the potential jurors with expertise. But this is not what trial lawyers do. We look to get rid of those with deep-seated biases, because we worry that such people will simply look for evidence during a trial to confirm them.

One example of what Welch thinks is an attempt to argue the case in the jury selection room and condition the jurors is the common question trial lawyers ask when talking about money and damages, “If you thought the injuries were substantial would you hesitate to bring back a substantial verdict?” But I (and so many others) ask it because I want to know about a political bias — do they have any feelings about one-size-fits-all damage caps? I would consider that information to be pretty important. So would my adversary.

And the reverse is also true when discussing the issue of damages, and is also asked: If the plaintiff shows only minimal injuries would you have any problem bringing back a minimal verdict? I’ve yet to meet a defense lawyer that is a potted plant. (The wise plaintiff’s lawyer asks both questions – asking about both the substantial and the minimal.)

Another example of bias are potential jurors who work in the medical field, sitting in a medical malpractice case. Are these people automatically excused due to their expertise?

Some would be inappropriate due to subconscious concerns about what their co-workers would say if they brought back a plaintiff’s verdict. It’s the lawyers job to ask about that bluntly and make the juror ponder it.

Yet others might acknowledge that they have seen all manner of bad things happen in a hospital. So dumping medically educated jurors or keeping them could go either way.

And more important than the medical practitioner is the parent of one. For now emotion/bias is even more likely to be a factor as the lawyers fear this juror seeing their own kid as a defendant.

Thus, Matt Welch’s two Reason articles are useful: Useful in describing the oft-times miserable experience that some jurors have, so that court administrators and legislators that hold the purse strings can address them and so that lawyers can appreciate what these potential jurors have gone through before the first questions are even asked.

But it is also useful in ways Welch might not have appreciated, as a good example of seeking out the underlying biases that potential jurors might have, and addressing head-on the concerns about them engaging in confirmation bias as they listen to the evidence.

Addendum: As I re-read this piece this morning while sitting in that same courthouse, just after publishing, I remembered I had written back in 2008 about the highly scientific method that I use for jury selection: Who Sits Jury Duty? (The Turkewitz Beer Test)