June 12th, 2018

NY Senate and Cyberbullying, Part 2

Last week I saw a tweet come into my feed from the NY Senate about the 56-0 passing of a cyberbullying bill. I quickly knocked out a post ripping it for two reasons: The complete lack of a definition and the fact that it violated the First Amendment.

That post was picked up by Scott Greenfield.  Then Greenfield’s post was seen by Tim Cushing at Techdirt. Which in turn was seen by Eugene Volokh. A little old school blogging as people added thoughts.

Now I have more to add: The first being a semi-correction that includes some  additional criticism of the Senate. But the second is some actual praise.

First, as Volokh pointed out, the bill was an amendment to the Education Law, and the Education Law has an existing definition of cyberbullying that is defined elsewhere. The first of the Senate’s failings was the lack of a reference to that definition section.

That lack of a reference, Greenfield points out today in likewise doing a second post on the subject, threw us both off as this isn’t the way New York usually drafts its statutes. As Greenfield notes:

Had it been the Senate’s intent to borrow the definition from another section of the Education Law to create its new crime, and, indeed, to establish the basic elements of the offense as would be minimally necessary for a crime to pass constitutional muster, there should have been a reference in the new crime to the definition upon which it relies. This is how New York laws are drafted, how a criminal offense is framed as to contain the bare minimum required to establish the elements of the offense.

It never occurred to Turk or me that there would be a New York law devoid of a definition or elements which would leave it to us to go searching the laws to figure out whether there was some definition, something to establish the elements of the offense, lurking in the darkness somewhere else. You don’t do that. You don’t create a crime and omit either the definition or an express reference back to the section setting forth the definition upon which the legislators relied.

This failure of form, hoping for an implicit reference to the definitions section that exists elsewhere, is the lesser of the two problems. Because that existing definition is so chock full of vagaries as to render it unconstitutional as a criminal statute. These are the provisions (as originally made into law for school administrative purposes, not criminal purposes):

the creation of a hostile environment by conduct or by threats, intimidation or abuse, including cyberbullying, that
(a) has or would have the effect of unreasonably and substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance, opportunities or benefits, or mental, emotional or physical well-being; or
(b) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause a student to fear for his or her physical safety; or
(c) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or emotional harm to a student; or
(d) occurs off school property and creates or would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment, where it is foreseeable that the conduct, threats, intimidation or abuse might reach school property.
Acts of harassment and bullying shall include, but not be limited to, those acts based on a person’s actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, religious practice, disability, sexual orientation, gender or sex. For the purposes of this definition the term “threats, intimidation or abuse” shall include verbal and non-verbal actions.

So let’s say that Student A passes Student B in the hall. A smiles at B. Then A texts to B, “I’ll see you on the playground at lunch!”

Are they friends? Enemies? Was A flirting with B? Threatening B? Does A simply want to hang out with B? Should B be afraid? Enthralled? Bored to tears?

Would this conduct and speech “reasonably be expected to cause a student to fear for his or her physical safety?”

Would this conduct and speech, unreasonably and substantially interfere with a student’s educational performance, opportunities or benefits, or mental, emotional or physical well-being?

Who the hell knows?

And if you can’t figure out whether something is a crime or not, then the law is vague. And it is likewise over broad as it will sweep up into its net perfectly innocent conduct and speech.

But there is another part to this posting. And that part is praise.

The praise is not for the bill, but for the Senate’s use of Twitter to quickly and cheaply disseminate information in an easily accessible form to the public.

For all the howling and caterwauling about how bad Twitter is, filled with bots, trolls, and those who think they will somehow “win” arguments and “own” their opponent, the one thing it is particularly good at is the rapid dissemination of information by public bodies.

That is how I easily found the bill’s Senate passage, and that is what allows us to publicly debate it’s merits.

So. The bill itself gets an F, but the Senate’s information distribution gets an A+.

 

 

June 4th, 2018

New York’s New and Improved (?) “Anti-Cyberbullying” Bill

It’s known in the New York Senate as Bill S2318. And it passed the Senate unanimously yesterday, by a vote of 56-0. Must be pretty good, huh? Unanimous!!!

It’s an anti-cyberbullying bill and who would ever want to be against something like that! I mean, bullying is bad, cyber or not, right?

Just one teensy little problem seems to have escaped the drafters, however. This “cyber-bullying” that they wish to make a misdemeanor has a flaw. I’m almost embarrassed to mention it, but here goes.

Cyber-bullying doesn’t seem to have a definition.

Here’s the entire pertinent text:

 S 12-A. CYBERBULLYING. 
1. AS USED IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING TERMS SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING MEANINGS:
A.  MINOR SHALL MEAN ANY NATURAL PERSON OR INDIVIDUAL UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN.
B. PERSON SHALL MEAN ANY NATURAL PERSON OR INDIVIDUAL.

2. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY ENGAGES IN A REPEATED COURSE OF  CYBERBUL-BULLYING OF A MINOR SHALL BE GUILTY OF AN UNCLASSIFIED MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE  BY  A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, OR BY A PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT NOT TO EXCEED ONE YEAR, OR BY BOTH SUCH FINE  AND  IMPRISONMENT.

There is, of course, lots of conduct that we can all agree is bullying, right?  A kid gets taunted by classmates for his less-than-personal personality, and it’s a no-brainer, right?

Well, almost right. I mean, friends do this kind of stuff to their good buddies after all.  It isn’t just for enemies.

But still, let’s say it is an “enemy” of sorts — two kids that actually hate each other. How do they know where the line in the sand is located as to what is legitimate and what isn’t?

So if Kid A wants to say that Kid B’s support of Trump is “idiotic” or “moronic,” or that Kid B seems to be a clueless asshat for believing what s/he believes, would that conduct, if done online, be cyber-bullying? How about if it didn’t involve politics at all, and was purely personal?

Don’t we have a right to call each other schmucks?

The lack of an adequate definition is an obvious problem, and one that is already known to New York because our top court struck down such a bill in 2014 in People v. Marquan M. — and that bill actually attempted a definition:

  1. “any act of communicating … by mechanical or electronic means,”
    • “including posting statements on the internet or through a computer or email network,”
    • “disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit photographs;”
    • “disseminating private, personal, false or sexual information,”
    • “or sending hate mail,”
  3. ”with no legitimate private, personal, or public purpose,”
  4. “with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, abuse, taunt, intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant emotional harm on another person.”

How, exactly, is a person to know if their conduct/speech is a problem if there’s no definition? We lawyers like to call such statutes vague or overbroad. They either don’t tell you exactly what conduct is criminal (vague) or they word the statute so broadly it sweeps perfectly constitutional conduct into its orbit of criminal conduct.

And now we have version 2.0 of a bill with no definition, and this is supposed to be better than version 1.0?

Since the matter was covered by Eugene Volokh back in 2014 when its first iteration was deep-sixed by the Court of Appeals, I feel no need to re-write what he already tapped out on his keyboard. You can read it here:  New York’s highest court strikes down cyber-bullying law

It was likewise covered by Scott Greenfield:  NY Court of Appeals Holds Cyberbullying Law Unconstitutional

And there’s a Syracuse Law Review article on the subject.  And the NY Civil Liberties Union.

And, for the legislators that might not want to read the works of lawyers, there’s even a Wikipedia entry for the case.

There is no point passing version 2.0 of a law that will one day be ruled unconstitutional.

I know it may look good to constituents to say  “We are trying to do something!”, but it would be nicer to see at least a couple of folks say, “I’m not going to waste the taxpayer’s money with a bill that most surely will end out on the trash heap.

Updated 6/12/18: NY Senate and Cyber-Bullying, Part 2

 

 

April 16th, 2018

Should the Disruptive CUNY Students Be Punished?

Last week I wrote about a group of students at CUNY Law who decided to disrupt the First Amendment speech of Prof. Josh Blackman. They didn’t like the way he thinks laws and the constitution should be interpreted, so they figured if they could shout him down this would magically change the way laws and the constitution get interpreted.

It didn’t go well for the students, and they’ve been widely widely ridiculed regarding their conduct. And yeah, the talk was to be about free speech, of all things.

But Prof. Eugene Volokh of UCLA Law — also the founder and longtime editor of group law blog The Volokh Conspiracy — has this interesting thought about whether these students should be punished:

The protest, I think, shows a narrow-mindedness on the students’ part, and an unwillingness to listen to substantive argument. But the heckling, which seems like an organized attempt to keep Blackman from speaking, is something much worse — something that universities ought to punish, and that I would think many universities would indeed punish, at least in other situations.

But the question of punishment is twofold: For even if you think they should be metaphorically spanked, the question remains as to constitutes suitable punishment. A punishment must, after all, fit the crime.

So here’s my two rupees on the subject. The answer to the first question is an easy yes. An organized effort to silence a speaker is a major no-no, not just for any university students, but especially for law students. They should know better.

And the “punishment” should be compulsory participation in CUNY’s Moot Court program, which exists as a competition among students.

For those non-lawyers reading here, the usual moot court format is for a legal problem to be given and a team of students to write a brief. One student might handle an issue of whether the case is properly in this court (jurisdiction) while another might handle the substantive part (i.e. Is it constitutionally protected speech if a person does xyz?).

The Moot Court room at SUNY Buffalo, my alma mater.

But this is the kicker, and the reason it’s such a valuable teaching tool: The students argue the side that they briefed on day one, but the next day must argue the other side. And they do it before a panel of “judges” that are busy firing questions at them as if in an appellate court. It’s the closest, most realistic, experience to an actual courtroom that a student will have in law school.

The requirement of arguing both sides forces the students to look at problems in a more objective light. It may force students to make arguments that run contrary to their own feelings about how a law should be read. It will force students to look at the warts of their own arguments, as almost all arguments have warts someplace.

Without an ability to understand all sides of an issue, it’s impossible for practicing lawyers to give objective advice to their clients — and that is what we get paid to do. This forces the issue to the forefront.

The moot court competition law school was, for me, the single most valuable experience of my academic experience. It did more to turn me from a student into a lawyer than anything else.

Those students that were disruptive — and it is yelling and screaming that are disruptive, not holding signs no matter how inane they may  be  — clearly have not yet learned enough about the law if they are acting out the way they did. They are not even close to ready for their legal careers and representing people.

While it may be easy to think some other, more traditional, type of punishment should be administered, the question any laws school should ask is, “What will make them better lawyers?”

And ten years later, they will send thank you notes to the administrators that made them do it and the professors that oversaw the program.

 

April 12th, 2018

Did CUNY Law Just Commit Suicide?

Was it smart for a CUNY Law student to try to stop Prof. Josh Blackman from speaking by yelling “Fuck the law?” Did this student’s friends and classmates think it wise trying to shut down a speech on, of all things, free speech?

Is this what they learn at CUNY Law? That if you don’t like the arguments or positions of another you scream and yell and have a tantrum?

Does anyone think this is good training for lawyers?

What would a judge think of such lawyers? What would clients think?

Is their training so shoddy that they don’t grasp there are differences of opinion on how a law or the constitution is read? Do they understand that certain things are inherently subject to interpretation, such as “unreasonable” search and seizure or “cruel and unusual” punishments?

Do they really think that the way to “beat” a conservative legal theorist is to holler?

Is their education so deficient that they don’t understand the long-term debate between those that think (loosely) that the Constitution is a living breathing document to be interpreted with the times and those that think it shouldn’t?

Do they understand that reasonable people can disagree on interpretations without name-calling? Do they not know that liberal icon Notorious R.B.G. was great friends with liberal boogeyman Antonin Scalia? Do they not know that sometimes liberals actually fall in love with conservatives and marry?

Why are they afraid of words?  Shouldn’t people secure in their ideas welcome the opportunity to openly debate? Are they afraid that in the marketplace of ideas they are unable to sell what they have? Do they understand that when they yell and scream others assume that they can’t win a debate?

How can someone get to law school not knowing that if you disagree with what a laws says, that the law can be changed? Have any of then ever tried?

Do they think that trying to shout down Josh Blackman will somehow change the law?

Are they so foolish that they don’t understand that the First Amendment is not a liberal thing, or a conservative thing, but an American thing?

Are they so clueless they don’t grasp that if one of them was stupidly arrested for holding a stupid sign calling Josh Blackman stupid names, that it would be the same Josh Blackman defending their right to display their stupidity to the world?

Have they never heard the saying, “I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it?”

Are they so daft that they fail to understand the magnitude of difference between interpreting what an existing law is, and advocating for what one hopes it should be?

More to the point, perhaps, but if these students are unable to tell the difference between interpreting the law and advocating for changes in the law, why are they in law school? What firm would ever hire them if they can’t grasp such a concept? Why would any firm trust a client to them? What client could possibly want them?

How could such lawyers, hell-bent on trying to shout down the opposition, ever argue a point of law in court? Indeed, how could they even handle a residential closing? A contract? A transaction of any kind?

And this is a public interest law school? What public interest group would want lawyers so terrified of their opponents that they feel the need to shout them down?

Have you ever met a client, lawyer or judge who felt such behavior was persuasive to make a point? Have any friends or family ever thought that shouting someone down was persuasive argument?

Which is more likely to occur, that these people will be disappointed as lawyers, or that they will be disappointing to clients?
———-

Elsewhere:

Organized Heckling at CUNY School of Law of Prof. Josh Blackman Talk on Free Speech (Volokh @ Reason)

…The protest, I think, shows a narrow-mindedness on the students’ part, and an unwillingness to listen to substantive argument. But the heckling, which seems like an organized attempt to keep Blackman from speaking, is something much worse — something that universities ought to punish, and that I would think many universities would indeed punish, at least in other situations….

Josh Blackman And The Guy Who Wanted To Hear (Greenfield @ Simple Justice)

…It was a talk about free speech on campus. Josh was invited. Some students, however, didn’t want him to speak and instead wanted him to know he was unwelcome.

The best answer to “why Josh” seems to be that these students were knee-jerk antagonistic to anyone, any idea, that wasn’t theirs. Children do this, which makes it all the more ironic that when they were finally shut down by an administrator, one protester responded, “we’re not children. You can’t talk to us like that.” Children say that, too….

The Disgrace at CUNY Law School (Hawyard @ Powerline):

…Prof. Blackman was greeted with a protest that was off the chart even on the usual scale of infantile campus protests. Go see his own full account and pictures of the event at his website. Among other offenses, Blackman had written that the Trump Administration was legally correct to rescind DACA because it exceeded the President’s authority. But Blackman supports enacting DACA through proper congressional legislation. This was apparently not sufficient for “law” students at CUNY Law….

“F*ck the law” – CUNY Law students attempt shout-down of conservative law prof (Jacobson @ Legal Insurrection)

…Blackman was invited to speak by the Federalist Society Chapter at the City University of New York (CUNY) Law School. That did not sit well with some progressive law school activists, who tried to shut down and shout-down the event…

CUNY students call law prof ‘racist’ for supporting free speech (Sabes @ Campus Reform)

…Blackman told Campus Reform that he was “shocked” by the disruption, saying this was the first time he was protested.

“I had hoped they would protest before my speech, and ask me tough questions afterwards,” he said. “Instead, they decided to heckle and interrupt me. At the time, I had no idea if or when they would stop heckling. Fortunately, it did not last the entire time.”…

“Stop debating”: CUNY Law students disrupt speaker and his critic (Harris @ FIRE)

…As you can see from the video, Blackman abandoned his planned remarks about free speech and instead tried to engage the protesters on their substantive criticisms of him, such as his writings about DACA. He explained that he actually supports the DREAM Act and would have voted for it in Congress, but that he believes the DACA policy — which President Obama adopted after Congress failed to pass the DREAM Act — was “not consistent with the rule of law.” He cited this (over jeers and interruptions) as an example of how one can “support something as a matter of policy, but find that the law does not permit it. And then the answer is to change the law.”

That sounds like the premise of an interesting debate, but the protesters would have none of it. Instead, they shouted out that he was “gaslighting” them and “lying to [him]self” — apparently, they already understood his views better than he did, so there was no need for any intellectual engagement. When an administrator intervened to remind the group that they had to let Blackman speak, they asked her, “Why are you bringing racists into your school” and (before Blackman had spoken more than a few prefatory words) “Why are you not providing support for students affected by this hate speech?”…

 

April 3rd, 2018

NY’s Top Court Upends Law on Summary Judgment

It’s long been the law in ¾ of New York that, in order to win summary judgment in a personal injury case, plaintiffs also had to show that they weren’t themselves also negligent.

That three-fourths fraction exists because, as I noted back in 2010, there was a split in the four New York appellate departments regarding this issue.

That split case law is now history, courtesy of (naturally) a 4-3 decision today in New York’s Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. City of New York.

The Court outlined the issue succinctly:

Whether a plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of a defendant’s liability, when, as here, defendant has arguably raised an issue of fact regarding plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Stated differently, to obtain partial summary judgment in a comparative negligence case, must plaintiffs establish the absence of their own comparative negligence. We hold that a plaintiff does not bear that burden.

Let’s take a garden variety matter of an individual crossing in the crosswalk, with the light in her favor. She gets hit by a car making a turn, whose driver failed to yield the right of way to the pedestrian.

Assuming that there is no question that she had the light, and was in the crosswalk, and was injured as a result of the collision, most people would have thought she could remove this issue from a trial and have the court determine the issue of the driver’s negligence as a matter of law.

But that wasn’t the case in New York, unless the pedestrian also proved that she was paying attention and didn’t do anything wrong. Some of our courts would deny the motion based on the issue of potential comparative fault, giving the driver a windfall by making his own negligent conduct a jury issue even though it was clear he broke the law and contributed to the injuries.

The Court used the example of a statutory violation being the basis of a motion for summary judgment being denied because, potentially, the plaintiff might also have some culpability:

For example, assuming in a hypothetical case a defendant’s negligence could be established as a matter of law because defendant’s conduct was in violation of a statute (see PJI 2:26) and further assuming plaintiff was denied partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s negligence because plaintiff failed to establish the absence of his or her own comparative negligence, the jury would be permitted to decide the question of whether defendant was negligent and whether defendant’s negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.

This was the windfall the Court wrote of: Why should the jury get the question of defendant’s negligence if it could be determined as a matter of law?

This is what we now refer to as “old law.” It’s in the dumpster.

The point of the underlying statutes, the court reasoned, was that the issue of comparative negligence was solely to deal with diminishing any potential recovery. It has no bearing on establishing whether a defendant is negligent.

Thus, a typical verdict sheet might have the five questions below, and if any of them can be resolved as a matter of law then that is the proper procedure for a trial court on hearing a motion for summary judgment:

1. Was the defendant negligent?

2. Was defendant’s negligence a substantial factor in causing [the injury or the accident]?

3. Was plaintiff negligent?

4. Was plaintiff’s negligence a substantial factor in causing (his or her) own injuries?

5. What was the percentage of fault of the defendant and what was the percentage of fault of the plaintiff?

What was the rationale for overturning the prior decision of the court, in Thoma v Ronai? The majority reasoned (and the dissent disputed) that the parties in Thoma didn’t raise the relevant parts of our civil practice law and rules so that they could be analyzed. So be it.

The net result of this decision will, I think, be two-fold:

  1. Plaintiffs that previously had had summary judgment denied will now move to reargue based on the new interpretation of the law, if possible; and
  2. More issues will be resolved prior to trial, leading to more settlements. Because it is uncertainty about how a jury will resolve an issue that most often hinders settlements.

When I wrote about this split in the appellate departments back in 2010, I said:

When the split between the lower appellate courts hits the Court of Appeals, hopefully it will see the wisdom of resolving issues on the papers in advance of trial if there is no issue of fact on that particular issue. There is no compelling reason that I see that partial summary judgment on the issue of liability should not be available if the particular issue raised doesn’t present a factual issue for a jury to resolve.

It feels good being able to revisit that issue and see it come out this way.