September 23rd, 2009

More Arrests In Insurance Fraud Ring


Seven workers from New York City hospitals and one lawyer were arrested today in a continuing probe by AG Andrew Cuomo regarding the sale of patient information.

The workers all came from city-owned hospitals in the Bronx; six from Lincoln Hospital and one from Jacobi. The lawyer comes from Dinkes & Schwitzer, a Manhattan firm that handles personal injury and medical malpractice matters.

I had covered this probe previously, along with similar matters, here:

Ambulance Chasers, Runners and Other Creeps (August 3, 2009)

Whether these individuals are guilty of the charges against them remains to be seen. If they are not, they should have their names cleared. But if they are, I’d like to see a very long stay at the gray bar hotel.

 

September 18th, 2009

Linkworthy


I’ve been too busy to post much, but a few links that are interesting:

Lawyer of the Day award goes to George Lobb, who crashed the most unusual party of all: One to break ground on a new courthouse;

Blawg Review #229 is up at Blawgletter;

This may not come as a shock to most, but prostitutes are not a tax deduction;

The PopTort on malpractice liability schemes;

A federal judge quits because the salary isn’t high enough. New York’s judges, of course, still remain underpaid as well;

Best of luck to my friends running the 200-mile Reach the Beach Relay in New Hampshire, which I ran last year but couldn’t make this year;

And Shana Tova to those celebrating the Jewish New Year this weekend.

 

September 12th, 2009

September 11 and The Day After

Yesterday was September 11th, and once again I elected not to write anything on the subject of the attack on our nation.

But I have written about the day after, in the form of a tribute to Ken Feinberg, who was the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund:

The Days After September 11th — A Tribute To An Attorney 

Feinberg subsequently was selected to be the “pay czar” for federal bailout money:

Ken Feinberg: The New Human Punching Bag 

 

September 11th, 2009

Does "No Cash" Rule of NYC Marriage Bureau Violate Federal Law?


Over at the WSJ Law Blog is a little post by Ashby Jones of a restaurant going cashless for security reasons. Credit cards only. He ponders whether this is legal given that greenbacks are legal tender “for all debts public and private.”

The law on this, from Section 31 U.S.C. 5103, is: “United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”

After a little analysis, he (sort of) concludes that as a private business they have a right to reject cash and not to do business with the cash-only patron, much the way a taxi driver might refuse all $100 bills.

But what of the government? When I went for a marriage license 10 years back, I was faced with NYC’s Marriage Bureau refusing to take cash. They absurdly insisted that I go to a bank and get a money order. They wouldn’t even accept credit cards.

I thought back then that this couldn’t possibly be legal, but with marital bliss upon me and a fiancee next to me, I wasn’t really in the mood to pick a fight.

But Jones’ post made me wonder if this rule had changed over the last 10 years, so I went to the NYC Marriage Bureau page and checked. And I found:

Fee
The fee for a Marriage License is $35 by credit card or money order payable to the City Clerk.

So now they accept credit cards. But still not actual cash, despite it being “legal tender for all debts public and private.”

Can that possibly be legal?

 

September 11th, 2009

Medical Malpractice (So You Think You Know What It Is?)


So you think you know what medical malpractice is? Well, last week a panel of appellate judges in New York split on the subject in Friedman v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.

The following scenario presented itself on a motion for summary judgment:

A patient died of blunt trauma to the right leg after her leg struck a bed rail while aides were preparing her for dinner and adjusting her bedding. The victim was bedridden and had fragile skin that was prone to rupture as a result of medications she took for her numerous ailments.

The majority concluded that this was an action in simple negligence because the alleged negligent act may be readily determined by the trier of fact based on common knowledge, and therefore, no special expertise was needed. Thus, on a motion for summary judgment, it was readily apparent that the court should not summarily dismiss the case as issues of fact existed for a jury to determine, and that an affidavit from an expert was not needed for such a purpose.

On the other hand, Justice James Catterson wrote in a long, analytical dissent that this was a malpractice case, because the harm to the patient — the rupture of her right leg, and a massive loss of blood resulting in death after her leg was allegedly knocked into a bed rail by an aide — was not foreseeable by the average, reasonably prudent person. Malpractice, from this perspective, is not just about diagnosis and treatment. The dissent pointed out that the Court of Appeals had not yet addressed what categories of health-related activity constitute medical treatment or bear a substantial relationship to the rendition of such treatment.

Catterson broke the arguments down like this, in determining that this was a malpractice case:

Silvercrest’s failure to realize or assess that her leg would rupture from being bruised on a bed rail involves diagnosis of her condition at the time, and therefore requires the special knowledge and skills of a health practitioner. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that “shifting a patient in bed does not require specialized medical knowledge.” But the plaintiff then further argues: Silvercrest “[d]ue to its knowledge of her physical condition, […] owed decedent a higher duty of care in its treatment of her. The breach of this duty resulted in foreseeable injury and ultimately, her demise.”

The dividing line between malpractice and simple negligence is sometimes easy to see, but sometimes not. And the place where it is difficult usually occurs in the hospital setting, often with falls that occur. Justice Catterson notes in his long dissent that falls from hospital beds due to a lack of bed rails were found to be negligence while another fall from an exam table was found to be malpractice. He also notes that the decisions seem, sometimes, to be arbitrary.

Is the issue an important one? You bet. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases was changed from the 3 years to 2 1/2 years as a result of pressure from the medical lobby. So if the case is brought after 2 1/2 years, and before 3 years, you can bet that the defense will claim the action is really one for medical malpractice and therefore time-barred.

The question, ultimately, may be one for a jury and not a court. I tried one case many moons back where a patient with a ruptured aneurysm in the brain fell off the angiogram table. On to her head. There were two issues for the jury regarding how she was secured to the table with tape:

1. Was it a departure from medical practice to use tape to secure this patient? (The malpractice question.)
2. Was the technician negligent in the manner in which the tape was used ? (General negligence.)

The jury answered the first question no (it was not malpractice) but the second question yes (it was negligence).

The lesson from this dispute? If you aren’t sure whether the case is malpractice or simple negligence, plead it both ways in the Complaint. And don’t wait until the 2 1/2 year statute of limitations on medical malpractice has expired. For the answer may well depend not only on what the Court of Appeals does one day on this issue to further define the concepts, but on the testimony of the defendants themselves as to who, when and where a particular action was ordered and the way that order was carried out (if at all). This is often beyond the knowledge of the plaintiff when a suit is started.