December 7th, 2006

Tort "Reform", Trent Lott, and Changing Fortunes

I learned at Tortdeform.com that Senator Trent Lott, a long time proponent of reducing the rights of consumers, may be having a change of heart.

The reason? Seems his home got wiped out by Katrina and State Farm won’t pay him what he thinks he is owed after they took his premiums. The shoe, it appears, is suddenly on the other foot for Senator Lott, as he now must do battle with his insurance company. He was victimized once by the storm, and doesn’t want to see it happen again.

He therefore hired high-profile plaintiff’s attorney Richard Scruggs.

The turnabout in personal fortune reminds me of Frank Cornelius, who wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times back in 1994. Mr. Cornelius tells his story in this excerpt better than I could:

Crushed By My Own Reform By Frank Cornelius
In 1975, I helped persuade the Indiana Legislature to pass what was acclaimed as a pioneering reform of the medical malpractice laws: a $500,000 cap on damage awards, and elimination of all damages for pain and suffering. I argued successfully that such limits would reduce health care costs and encourage physicians to stay in Indiana — the same sort of arguments that now underpin the medical industry’s call for national malpractice reform.

Today, from my wheelchair, I rue that that accomplishment. Here is my story.

On February 22, 1989, I underwent routine arthroscopic surgery after injuring my left knee in a fall. The day I left the hospital, I experienced a great deal of pain and called the surgeon several times. He called back the next day and told my wife to get me a bedpan. He then left on a skiing trip. I sought out another surgeon, who immediately diagnosed my condition as a reflex sympathetic dystrophy — a degenerative nervous disorder brought on by trauma or infection, often during surgery. * * *

At the age of 49, I am told that I have less than two years to live.

My medical expenses and lost wages, projected to retirement if I should live that long, come to more than $5 million. Claims against the hospital and physical therapist have been settled for a total of $500,000 — the limit on damages for a single incident of malpractice. The Legislature has raised that cap to $750,000, and I may be able to collect some extra damages if I can sue those responsible for the August 1990 incident that nearly killed me. But apparently because of bureaucratic inertia, the state medical panel that certifies such claims has yet to act on mine.

The kicker, of course, is that I fought to enact the very law that limits my compensation. All my suffering might have been worthwhile, on some cosmic scale, if the law had accomplished its stated purpose. But it hasn’t.

Indiana’s health care costs increased 139.4 percent from 1980 to 1990 — just about the national average. The state ranked 32nd in per capita health spending in 1990 — the same as in 1980.

It is understandable that the damage cap has done nothing to curb health care spending; the two have almost nothing to do with each other. In 1992, the Congressional Budget Office reported that medical malpractice litigation accounted for less than 1 percent of total healthcare spending. I doubt that the percentage in Indiana is much different.

Make no mistake; damage caps are arbitrary, wholly disregarding the nature of the injury and the pain experience by the plaintiff. They make it harder to seek and recover compensation for medical injuries; extend unwarranted special protection to the medical industry; and remove the only effective deterrent to negligent medical care, since the medical profession has never done an effective job of disciplining negligent doctors.

Medical negligence cannot be reduced simply by restricting consumers’ legal rights. That will happen only when the medical industry begins to effectively police its own. I don’t expect to see that day.

 

December 6th, 2006

Two Personal Injury Lawyers Sentenced in Billing Scam

I never liked the “Blue Code of Silence” that cops use to protect the bad apples, and I don’t like the “White Coat of Silence” that some doctors use to protect each other. So if I don’t like it for others, then I won’t do it myself.

Which brings me to this AP story that appeared last week in Newsday:

NEW YORK (AP) – Two personal injury lawyers who pleaded guilty to stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars from clients were sentenced Thursday to community service and five years probation after repaying the money they stole.

Michael Mann, of Little Silver, N.J., and Joshua Just, of Manhattan, pleaded guilty in August to scheme to defraud. They admitted that from 2003 through 2005 their Manhattan law firm, Mann & Just LLP, stole at least $275,000 from at least 10 clients by charging for expenses the firm never incurred.

While some in other professions may look away from their own problems — and every business or industry has them, from teachers to clerics –I don’t think that we should follow that script. There are bad actors in every business, and the others in the business ought to be on the front lines of cleaning it up, not hiding it. And so I give this story just a tiny bit more of publicity.

Because the plea deal was for felony conviction, both people will be disbarred. As they should.

 

December 5th, 2006

US Supreme Court Hears Punitive Damages Case, Again

The issue of punitive damages in personal injury cases came before the Supreme Court recently. For the second time in this case. And based on the oral argument, possibly not the last.

In a highly watched case, Philip Morris v. Williams (05-1256) was argued October 31st, with the Justices hinting it may send the case back to the state court from which it came, instead of resolving an open question: How much in punitive damages should a jury be allowed to award?

In Williams, an Oregon jury returned $800,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5M in punitives. Thus began a journey up the appellate ladder in Oregon, where the verdict was affirmed by the state’s highest court, and then on to Washington for an ultimate review by the US Supreme Court. But the Supremes, in the meantime, had decided another punitive damage case (State Farm v. Campbell) and sent Williams back to Oregon to reconsider in light of its opinion.

So after doing an extraordinarily detailed analysis of State Farm, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the punitive damage award in this personal injury tobacco case that was almost 100x the compensatory award, writing:

Philip Morris showed indifference to and reckless disregard for the safety not just Williams, but of countless other Oregonians, when it knowingly spread false or misleading information to keep smokers smoking. Philip Morris’s actions were no isolated incident, but a carefully calculated program spanning decades.

Thus, Philip Morris asked the US Supreme Court to review again.

The State Farm opinion has been the source of much legal discussion. In part, it seems to put limits on the amount of punitive damages that can be awarded, and discusses a ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages. At one point the court mentions a multiplier of 4x and another of 10x, and in other parts specifically saying that there are no “bright line” tests for how much is too much. The source of the limits is that some justices believe that a large punitive damage award violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

What makes Phillip Morris interesting is that it is a personal injury matter, not some commercial dispute. It thus differs from the other cases the high court has heard on the issue. It remains to be seen if the court will create constitutional protections for reckless conduct that endangers the health, safety and welfare of the public, where no such protection presently exists.

So what happened before the US Supreme Court on the new review? Well, it seems that right after oral argument started, the justices got caught up in a contradictory jury instruction that had been requested by Philip Morris. If you read the second sentence, which I placed in italics, you see the contradiction:

“The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Williams [the deceased smoker] by the defendant’s punishable misconduct. Although you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which juries can resolve their claims and award punitive damages for those harms, as such other juries see fit.

So Philip Morris was claiming the jury may consider the harm suffered by others, but can’t punish them for it. What, exactly, does that mean? Perhaps it is no wonder the court refused to give the instruction. The high court justices themselves were confused, as you can see in this ScotusBlog note regarding the argument. A transcript of the oral argument is here. Justice Ginsburg got the ball rolling with this:

JUSTICE GINSBURG: You don’t think that
would confuse the jury if they are first told that they
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others, and
then the next instruction seems to say they can’t?

The court will likely decide the case by June. But don’t be surprised if they avoid the issue and send it back (again) to the Oregon courts to flesh out the issue of the jury instructions.

Links to this post:

court tosses philip morris verdict, and further confuses punitive
cross-posted from ny personal injury law blog. the supreme court came down with a split decision on punitive damages today, avoiding a determination in a highly watched case on the penultimate issue of “how much is too much.
posted by Eric Turkewitz @ February 20, 2007 2:48 PM

 

December 4th, 2006

Waiver of Claims, Before Negligent Act, Is Not A Bar To Lawsuit

In medical malpractice cases a person often signs a waiver of any claims when they agree to undergo surgery, at the same time they sign a consent. In the medical malpractice setting, this is usually one of a batch of forms shoved in front of a patient before surgery that few people even read. So the question becomes, does signing such a waiver prevent a lawsuit from being brought based on negligent conduct?
The short answer is no. New York, as well as other states, has long held that such an agreement to waive a claim of negligence is against public policy. And if the agreement is against public policy, the court won’t try to enforce it. One can not simply have a person waive a claim to future acts of negligence.
However, if a waiver is drafted smartly by a defendant it will describe various injuries or events that can happen during surgery, as part of the consent. If this is done it makes it easier for the defendant as they can point to the waiver form and claim that the person knew this was a risk of the event.
The question here is not whether the risk was known, but rather, whether due care used to avoid that known risk.

 

November 29th, 2006

Failed Security Lawsuits: Why Building Owners Are Liable

This case from Missouri appeared in one of the jury verdict reporters I receive, and I think it illustrates well the issues presented when personal injury results from failed security. The issues are the same whether it occurs in Missouri, New York, or elsewhere:

Tenant attacked in hallway of apartment building: Failure to properly maintain premises: Rape: Emotional trauma: Settlement.

X.Y.Z., 24, was exiting her apartment when a man attacked her and forced her back inside. He robbed and raped X.Y.Z. and burglarized her apartment. X.Y.Z. suffered emotional trauma and now is afraid to be alone in her apartment or in crowds of strangers…

X.Y.Z. sued the owner and operator of her apartment building. Suit alleged the key-operated lock to the back door did not function properly, allowing individuals without keys to gain access to the building. Plaintiff claimed defendants were aware of the malfunctioning lock but failed to repair it.

Defendants denied they were responsible for the attack and contended they had no knowledge of the defective lock. Plaintiff countered with maintenance work orders that showed problems with the back door lock two months before she was attacked.

The parties settled before trial for $700,000, with an additional $15,000 to be donated to the local rape crisis center on plaintiff’s behalf.

While building owners are not the attackers in these personal injury cases, the owners may be liable for having failed in the duty to provide security. If there is a broken door lock in an apartment building in a high crime area, for example, and they know about it but do nothing, it is not a question of if someone will be attacked, but when. Since the owners owe a duty of care to the residents, if they act negligently and breach that duty, they would be liable for damages to the individual.